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WAS SOCRATES A CHRISTIAN BEFORE CHRIST?
KIERKEGAARD AND THE
PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN UNIQUENESS
Michael A. Cantrell

Kierkegaard’s belief that Socrates embodied a prefigurement of Christian
neighbor love militates against the claim that Kierkegaard believed there was
absolutely no intimation of the obligation to love the neighbor in paganism.
Kierkegaard also accepted that any awareness of the obligation to love the
neighbor must be divinely originated. These beliefs and Kierkegaard’s other
claims regarding the daimonion and Socrates’s “becoming a Christian” support the view that Kierkegaard believed Socrates to have been a recipient
of special divine revelation. The plausibility of this conclusion and its consistency with Kierkegaard’s apostle/genius distinction is explored. Finally,
speculative reasons are given as to why God might have chosen to give
Socrates the daimonion.

The second-century Christian apologist Justin Martyr once claimed that
those among the ancient Greeks who lived in accordance with reason were,
in fact, Christians. Justin points to Socrates by name, going so far as to say
that Socrates actually had a partial knowledge of Christ.1 Justin Martyr is not
the only Christian thinker to have made such extraordinary claims about
Socrates. In this paper, I consider those claims made by the nineteenthcentury Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. I argue that, although the
statement that “Kierkegaard saw Socrates as a Christian before Christ” is
probably misleading, it is nonetheless probably not inaccurate.
Parts I and II examine Kierkegaard’s claims about the uniqueness
of Christianity and discuss reasons for thinking that Kierkegaard saw
Socrates as something of an exception to these uniqueness claims. Part III
argues that Kierkegaard was committed to the view that Socrates was the
recipient of special divine revelation by means of his daimonion. Part IV
evaluates Kierkegaard’s statements about Socrates through the categories
of The Book on Adler, concluding that, for Kierkegaard, Socrates occupies
an unexcluded conceptual middle ground between the “genius” and the
“apostle.” Part V explores how Socrates could have been the beneficiary of
1
Cf. Justin Martyr, “First Apology of Justin Martyr,” ch. XLVI, and “Second Apology of
Justin Martyr,” ch. X in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), Vol. 1.
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special divine revelation yet still fail to possess any authority on account
of that revelation. Part VI hazards a couple of broad speculations as to
what Kierkegaard might have believed regarding why God chose to give
Socrates the daimonion. Finally, part VII concludes the paper, drawing out
the implication of Kierkegaard’s belief that, regardless of how many times
an awareness of the obligation to love might have appeared in human
history, it is something that must be divinely impressed anytime it appears.
I. The Challenge of the Uniqueness Claim
In his book Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, C. Stephen Evans develops a divine
command theory of moral obligation that is similar in many respects to
that defended by Robert M. Adams.2 Evans maintains that moral obligations are rooted in divine commands that are promulgated to human
beings through both special and general revelation. But Evans does not
merely develop this view as a plausible philosophical position. Rather, as
he maintains, the view he describes is actually Kierkegaard’s ethical view
as well.
I am not concerned in this paper to argue for or against Evans’s broad
account of Kierkegaard’s ethical views. Yet, while I find much that is admirable in Evans’s work, I am for the moment interested in a particular
interpretive obstacle for Evans’s view that arises out of Kierkegaard’s
Works of Love. Evans argues that Kierkegaard believes that part of the
central Christian ethical teaching (i.e., the love commandment, “You shall
love your neighbor as yourself”) is promulgated through general revelation, with the result that it is universally available. The obstacle is what
Evans identifies in his book as Kierkegaard’s “uniqueness claim.”3 Evans
characterizes the uniqueness claim as follows: Kierkegaard believed that
“Christian teachings are not only unique and unknown in paganism, but
contain within themselves the ‘possibility of offense,’ a natural tendency
to shock and disturb the person who has not been fully transformed by
Christianity.”4 Such a claim poses a problem for Evans’s project because
if Christian teachings are “unique and unknown in paganism,” this cuts
against the view that the love commandment is promulgated through
general revelation.
To meet this challenge, Evans marshals textual evidence to argue
that other views to which Kierkegaard is committed militate against the
uniqueness claim. By my count, Evans offers three considerations by which
he purports to show that Kierkegaard himself does not (or at least should
not) accept the uniqueness claim.5 First, he argues that it is hard to see
2
Cf. Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), chaps. 10 and 11.
3
C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 158–159.
4
Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 158.
5
Evans gives several other arguments in this section. However, it is hard to see how these
other arguments are intended to establish that the specific obligation to love the neighbor is
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how the uniqueness claim “could be reconciled with [Kierkegaard’s] claim
that God has placed love ‘within the ground’ of every human person.”6
As I read the passage7 to which Evans refers, however, Kierkegaard commits himself only to the conditional claim that if a person is ethically or
spiritually “built up,” then God has implanted love in his or her heart.8 But
suppose that we grant Evans his preferred reading, i.e., that Kierkegaard
believes that God has in fact “placed love within the ground” of every
person. As it turns out, this still does not get Evans all that he needs. For,
to count against the uniqueness claim, he needs to show not simply that
love is somewhere present without a special revelation, but rather that an
awareness of the obligation to love is so present.9 After all, Kierkegaard is
quite emphatic that what is striking about Christian love is that it is commanded. Not love but the “you shall love” is the mark of the distinctively
Christian teaching.
The same consideration serves to cast doubt on the promise of a second
passage to which Evans appeals in support of his interpretation. Evans argues that Kierkegaard “explicitly admits that since Christianity is nothing
new in the sense of ‘novelty,’ that there are parallels of a sort between
Christian teachings and paganism.”10 The passage of Kierkegaard’s to
which Evans refers is the following: “The commandment [i.e., ‘You shall
love’] is not something new in an accidental sense, nor a novelty in the
sense of something curious, nor something new in a temporal sense. Love
had existed also in paganism, but this obligation to love is a change of
eternity—and everything has become new.”11 Kierkegaard here clearly
acknowledges that love “existed also in paganism,” and this certainly
constitutes a parallel of sorts to Christian love; unfortunately, however,
this is not a parallel that is useful to Evans’s attempt to argue against the
uniqueness claim. Rather, what Evans needs for this purpose is a passage
in which Kierkegaard recognizes some pagan individual as possessing an
awareness of the obligation to love.
The strongest evidence that Evans produces for his view is precisely his
observation that Kierkegaard sees Socrates as embodying a prefigurement
of Christian love. One of the passages that Evans has in mind is worth
quoting at length:
promulgated through general revelation, as opposed to establishing merely that some moral
obligations are so promulgated.
6
Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 159–160.
7
Kierkegaard writes, “But can one human being implant love in another human being’s
heart? No, this is a suprahuman relationship, an inconceivable relationship between human
beings; in this sense human love cannot build up. It is God, the Creator, who must implant
love in each human being, he who himself is Love.” Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 216.
8
Cf. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 216.
9
More precisely, Evans needs to show that Kierkegaard thought this to be the case.
10
Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 159.
11
Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 25.
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[W]hy did that simple wise man of old [i.e., Socrates] . . . compare himself
to a “gadfly” at the same time as he called himself a divine gift, and why
did he love young people so much? As for the first, was it not because he,
as a pagan, . . . had loved people in something higher, that is, because he
had had an awakening influence . . . ? As for the latter, was it not because
he perceived that young people still had a receptivity for the divine . . . ?
Therefore, because he, by means of the eternal and “something divine,” had
prevented his love for people from coming to a standstill . . . , that is, because
he, by holding himself close to the requirement, had been like a requirement
to the people.12

Unlike Evans’s other arguments, this one does militate against the claim that
the obligation to love one’s neighbor was absolutely “unique and unknown
in paganism.” For example, Kierkegaard here speaks of Socrates, “as a
pagan . . . lov[ing] people in something higher.” Furthermore, Kierkegaard
says it was “by means of the eternal and ‘something divine’” that Socrates
was moved to love other people in this way. “The eternal” is Kierkegaard’s
typical poetic manner of referring to an individual’s God-relationship.
Kierkegaard elsewhere speaks of Socrates’s God-relationship as mediated by his daimonion,13 the curious “divine sign” that opposes Socrates
whenever he is about to undertake some wrongful (or at least some lessthan-ideal) course of action.14 As for the “something divine,” this is actually
a transliteration of the precise language that Socrates himself uses to refer
to his daimonion. So in this passage Kierkegaard strongly indicates that
Socrates’s daimonion-mediated God-relationship was the “awakening influence” that moved him to love people and to call himself a “divine gift.”
And that is not all. Contextual facts confirm that Kierkegaard here is
making quite an extraordinary claim about Socrates’s awareness of an obligation to love other people. Kierkegaard says that Socrates was capable
of such love because he “h[eld] himself close to the requirement.” This is
significant because the context of the quotation makes it clear that “the

Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 128–129.
The entry states:
Ah, now I understand it! Socrates’s daemon was always merely dissuading
because Socrates’s God-relationship was dialectical. The immediate God-relationship is positive. But the dialectical God-relationship begins in a certain sense with
nothing, and God first comes in the next round. If I have no immediacy, then I
must always make the first step myself. God does not immediately or directly tell
me what I am supposed to do. I do it; according to my best deliberations I regard
it as the best, and I present it now to God, humbling myself and my resolution, my
plan, my action under God.
Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, 7 vols., ed. and trans. Howard
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978) II:107
(#1373); cf. Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, ed. P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting, 20 vols.
I–XI.3 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909–1948), IX A 242.
14
Cf. e.g., Plato, Apology, 31c–d; Phaedrus, 242b–c. All translations of Plato’s works are
those in Plato’s Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
12
13
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requirement” is that of “the Law,”15 that is, “God’s Law,”16 “the Law of love.”17
Indeed, in the chapter from which this quotation comes (entitled “Love is
the Fulfilling of the Law”), the phrase, “the Law’s requirement” (my emphasis) occurs no less than twenty times. It appears, then, that Kierkegaard
is attributing to Socrates some awareness of, and obedience to, the obligation to love the neighbor.18
Of Evans’s three arguments, only the last represents a plausible exception to the uniqueness claim. The next section takes a closer look at
Kierkegaard’s uniqueness claim itself, to specify in more precise terms
how this claim should be understood.
II. The Complexity of the Uniqueness Claim
Where in Works of Love is Kierkegaard’s uniqueness claim to be found? As it
turns out, there is no one passage in which Kierkegaard articulates such a
claim. This is because, as I maintain, what Evans identifies as Kierkegaard’s
“uniqueness claim” is actually a conjunction of two separate theses, which
(following Kierkegaard’s language) I shall term the “divine-origination
thesis” and the “no-intimation thesis,” respectively.
First, the divine-origination thesis is linked to Kierkegaard’s claim that
the obligation to love “did not arise in any human being’s heart,” an allusion to I Corinthians 2:9. This thesis asserts that one can become aware of
the obligation to love the neighbor only through a divine revelation. The
following passage is typical:
What courage it takes to say for the first time “You shall love,” or, more
correctly, what divine authority it takes to turn the natural man’s conceptions and ideas upside-down with this phrase! There at the boundary where
human language halts and courage fails, there revelation breaks forth with
divine origination and proclaims what is not difficult to understand in the
sense of profundity or human parallels but which did not arise in any human being’s heart. It actually is not difficult to understand once it has been
expressed; indeed, it wants only to be understood in order to be practiced,
but it did not arise in any human being’s heart.19

Cf., e.g., Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 128–129.
Cf. Ibid., 126.
17
Cf. Ibid., 118.
18
Jacob Howland has observed that, for Kierkegaard, “Socrates’s life is graced by an extraordinary integrity of understanding and existing. In him, speech and deed, logos and
ergon, are one; his actions are fully in harmony with his grasp of the truth.” Kierkegaard and
Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 213.
Howland explains that Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, “Climacus[,] makes it clear in [Concluding
Unscientific] Postscript that Socrates’s philosophical passion is extraordinary. Kierkegaard
agrees. In his journals, he indicates that Socrates is unique in being able, without following
Christ’s example, to live up to his understanding of the truth and thus to actualize the
ideal. Others simply lack the condition of genuinely philosophical eros that makes this possible.” Ibid., 211–212. See also the epilogue of Howland’s book, which examines several of
Kierkegaard’s intriguing statements about Socrates.
19
Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 24–25.
15
16
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The divine origination thesis is stated four times in Works of Love, and
every instance is to be found in chapter II, section A.20
Second, the no-intimation thesis is the simple claim that there is no intimation of neighbor love (i.e., of the obligation to love the neighbor) in
paganism. Following are two of those passages:
One must rather take care to make it very clear that the praise of erotic
love and friendship belongs to paganism . . . so that with the sure spirit of
conviction we can give to Christianity what is Christianity’s, love for the
neighbor, of which love no intimation [Anelse] is to be found in paganism.21

And again,
Christianity has misgivings about erotic love and friendship simply because
preferential love in passion or passionate preference is actually another form
of self-love. Paganism has never dreamed of this. . . . [P]aganism has never
had an inkling [aldrig har anet] of self-denial’s love for the neighbor, whom
one shall love.22

The Danish noun Anelse in the first passage is well-translated into English
as “intimation.” The semantic range of Anelse overlaps that of the English
words presentiment, anticipation, suggestion, clue, and hint.23 Likewise,
the Danish phrase aldrig har anet, meaning “never had a presentiment /
clue / hint / (etc.)” is also well captured by the translation of the second
passage. Thus, the no-intimation thesis states that there is no intimation of
the obligation to love the neighbor in paganism. This thesis occurs three
times in Works of Love, and every instance is to be found in chapter II,
section B.24
It turns out that what Evans calls the uniqueness claim is actually the
conjunction of the divine-origination thesis and the no-intimation thesis—
a fact that is supported by Evans’s appeal to instances of both theses to
support his way of characterizing the uniqueness claim.25 The conjunction
of these theses reads as follows: one can become aware of the obligation to
love the neighbor only through a divine revelation and there is no intimation of neighbor love in paganism. Each conjunct makes a claim whose
truth-value is logically independent of the other’s. Therefore, each conjunct can stand or fall independently of the other. Were one to attempt to
discredit the uniqueness claim, it would suffice merely to cast doubt on
one of its conjuncts.
With this fact in mind, we should reflect again on the arguments Evans
gives in support of his interpretation of Kierkegaard’s ethical views. As it
Cf. Ibid., 24–25, 27, and 42.
Ibid., 44.
22
Ibid., 53; the second sentence begins a new paragraph.
23
See, e.g., the entry for “anelse” in Dansk-Engelsk Ordbog, ed. Jens Axelsen (Copenhagen:
Gyldendal, 1978).
24
Cf. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 44, 53, and 57.
25
Cf. Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 157.
20
21

WAS SOCRATES A CHRISTIAN BEFORE CHRIST?

129

happens, all the considerations Evans advances against the uniqueness claim
are aimed at only one of its conjuncts—the no-intimation thesis.26 As we
noted, Evans’s first two arguments fall short of the mark, but the third provides strong reasons to doubt Kierkegaard’s across-the-board commitment
to the no-intimation thesis. Evans’s third argument points to Kierkegaard’s
belief that Socrates possessed some awareness of the obligation to love the
neighbor—a clear counterexample to the no-intimation thesis.
It is important to note that Kierkegaard’s belief that Socrates possessed
some awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor is not contrary to a
statement that Kierkegaard later makes to the effect that Socrates lacked
knowledge of the obligation to love the neighbor. Later in Works of Love,
Kierkegaard discusses Socrates’s language in the Symposium about loving
one who is ugly.27 Kierkegaard identifies love for an ugly person with commanded neighbor-love, and he states that Socrates knew nothing about
the fact that “one shall love him” (emphasis in original). Kierkegaard
says, “one shall love him—that simple wise man knew nothing about this;
he did not know that the neighbor existed and that one shall love him.
His talk about loving the ugly was just teasing.”28 Clearly, Kierkegaard
states that Socrates did not have knowledge that one is obligated to love
the neighbor. Thus, whatever awareness Socrates’s “awakening influence”
gave him, that awareness fell short of full-blown knowledge of the obligation to love the neighbor. But it is by no means necessary to possess
knowledge of that obligation in order to have an awareness that amounts to
or even rises above an intimation of it. So Kierkegaard’s statement does not
conflict with his other remarks to the effect that Socrates possessed some
awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor.
In sum, because Kierkegaard believed that Socrates had some awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor, Evans’s argument successfully
shows that Kierkegaard did not have an across-the-board commitment to
the no-intimation thesis.29
III. Socrates’s Divine Revelation
To take stock of what has been established thus far: on one hand, Kierkegaard’s remarks on Socrates give us reason to doubt his across-the-board
26
Of course, Evans sometimes talks as if his first argument is aimed at undermining the
divine origination thesis; however, this is a moot point, since the argument fails to provide
grounds for doubting either thesis.
27
See Plato’s Symposium, 210b–c. The statement is put into the mouth of Diotima.
28
The emphasis is in the original. This is my translation of the following passage, which is
found at location IX.353 of the Danish text: “Man skal elske ham, dette vidste hiin eenfoldige
Vise Intet om, han vidste ikke, at Næsten var til og at man skulde elske ham, det han talte om
at elske den Stygge var blot et Drillerie.” In the Princeton edition of Works of Love, which is
translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, the corresponding passage is on p. 373.
29
Kierkegaard’s journals contain other interesting comments on Socrates. For example,
Kierkegaard wrote, “Outside of Christianity Socrates stands alone—you noble, simple wise
man—you were actually a reformer.” Journals and Papers, VI: 508 (#6871); cf. Papirer, XI.1 A
133.
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commitment to the no-intimation thesis. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s
commitment to the divine-origination thesis has escaped unscathed.
Therefore, we are left with Kierkegaard’s commitment to two claims:
first, that Socrates possesses some awareness of the obligation to love the
neighbor. And, second, that one can come to possess some awareness of
the obligation to love the neighbor only through a divine revelation. Now,
one might pause to ask whether this is a problem. After all, taking these
two claims as premises, one could by modus ponens validly conclude that
Kierkegaard is logically committed to Socrates’s having received a divine
revelation.
Given only what has been established thus far, one might argue that
general revelation is sufficient to account for Socrates’s awareness of the
obligation to love the neighbor. Perhaps Socrates was unusually receptive to the general revelation that is universally available in creation. If
this were the case, then Kierkegaard’s commitment to Socrates’s having
received a divine revelation would amount to nothing more sensational
than a commitment to accessibilism, a position in Christian soteriological
debates. Accessibilists maintain, in part, that those who are without the
benefit of special revelation can still gain salvation through a Spirit-enabled
response of trust to the general revelation of God in nature, experience,
and reason.30 (Accessibilism is typically contrasted with forms of what is
variously called restrictivism or exclusivism, the view that salvation is available only to those individuals with explicit knowledge of Christian special
revelation.) In fact, one might argue, this commitment really amounts to
something weaker than the accessibilist position, for no reason has been
given to show that Kierkegaard believed that Socrates actually obtained
salvation.
This last point would stand securely were it not for a telling remark that
Kierkegaard makes in The Point of View for My Work as an Author. Speaking
of Socrates’s indirect method of communication, Kierkegaard says, “in this
respect I calmly stick to Socrates. True, he was no Christian, that I know,
although I also definitely remain convinced that he has become one.”31
While it is hard to know exactly how to interpret this statement, it seems
at least to indicate Kierkegaard’s “definite . . . convi[ction]” that Socrates
achieved salvation at some time subsequent to his physical death. This is
naturally interpreted as a belief in postmortem evangelization, the view
that a person who was not evangelized before death enjoys an opportunity to respond to the Christian gospel subsequent to his or her death.32

30
A version of accessibilism is defended in Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved? Reassessing Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004).
31
Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author trans. Howard V. Hong
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 54.
32
While I do not hold a postmortem evangelization view, proponents of that view often
cite John 3:18 and 1 Peter 3:18–4:6 in support of their position.
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Historically, the early Church Father Clement of Alexandria held a
postmortem evangelization view.33 Other proponents include nineteenthcentury author George MacDonald, theologians Donald Bloesch, George
Lindbeck, and Gabriel Fackre, and philosopher Stephen T. Davis.34 If
Kierkegaard believed in some sort of postmortem evangelization, then
the question of how to characterize his view turns on whether that
evangelization is itself supposed to take the form of general or special
revelation. If the former, then Kierkegaard would seem to be committed
to a sort of straightforward postmortem accessibilism. If the latter, then
Kierkegaard’s position appears to be that Socrates received a postmortem
version of what Terrance L. Tiessen calls “particular but nonuniversally
normative revelation,”35 or as I call it, “nonuniversally-normative special
revelation.” As Tiessen describes it, this kind of revelation “is ‘special’ in
its particularity or limited address, but it is not ‘special’ in the sense of
being revelation from God intended for everyone, everywhere—that is, it
is not universally normative.”36
Either way, Kierkegaard’s “definite . . . convi[ction] that [Socrates] has
become [a Christian]” fits naturally at the intersection of Kierkegaard’s
own unabashed Christian commitment, his superlative admiration for
Socrates, and his awareness of Socrates’s view that even the unexamined
afterlife would not be worth living. In the Apology, Socrates considers
“that there is good hope that death is a blessing” because it is possible
that death is “a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another
place.”37 Socrates reflects:
If . . . anyone arriving in Hades . . . will find those true jurymen who are
said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and
Triptolemus and the other demi-gods who have been upright in their own
life, would that be a poor kind of change? Again, what would one of you
give to keep company with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I
am willing to die many times if that is true. It would be a wonderful way
for me to spend my time whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax, the son of
Telamon, and any other of the men of old who died through an unjust conviction, to compare my experiences with theirs. I think it would be pleasant. Most important, I could spend my time testing and examining people
there, as I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is,
but is not.38

See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 6.6.
See Gabriel Fackre, Ronald H. Nash, and John Sanders, What About Those Who Have
Never Heard? Three Views on the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1995), 20; see also John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the
Unevangelized (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2001); Stephen T. Davis, “Universalism,
Hell, and the Fate of the Ignorant,” Modern Theology 6 (1990), 176.
35
Tiessen uses this exact phrase in Who Can Be Saved?, 139
36
Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?, 120.
37
Plato, Apology, 40c.
38
Plato, Apology, 41a–c.
33
34
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Kierkegaard naturally would have conceived Christ as among those
who, in Socrates’s words, were “upright in their own life” and who “died
through an unjust conviction.” It is fascinating to imagine the possibility
that Christ was among those whom Socrates “test[ed] and examin[ed]” to
determine “who among them is wise.”
Regardless of what we make of Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates’s postmortem experience, however, there remains the question regarding the
source of Socrates’s premortem awareness—that is, Socrates’s awareness
during his lifetime—of the obligation to love the neighbor. Can that awareness be explained as the result of general revelation? Above we saw that
Kierkegaard indicates that it was “by means of the eternal and ‘something
divine’”—that is, by the daimonion-mediated God-relationship—that
Socrates came to some awareness of the obligation to love.
The daimonion has been so embarrassing to some modern scholars that
they have attempted to explain it away as nothing more than the voice
of conscience. But this simply will not do. For, besides the daimonion’s
making its appearance in some situations where no moral wrong is about
to be committed,39 Socrates makes clear that it is a quite rare phenomenon, having happened, as he says, “to no one before [him], or to only a
very few.”40 By that remark, Socrates was not accusing the vast majority of
humanity as being without a conscience. Kierkegaard was aware of this
fact, having written a section of his dissertation on Socrates’s daimonion
in which he affirmed both its historical reality as well as its externality
to Socrates’s subjectivity.41 All of these factors indicate that Kierkegaard’s
understanding of the daimonion’s activity simply cannot be cashed out in
terms of general revelation. Rather, it must be understood as a case of
nonuniversally-normative special revelation—and this is the position to
which it appears that Kierkegaard was committed.42
I should hasten to point out that viewing the pagan Socrates as a recipient of nonuniversally-normative special revelation is not so outlandish
a position as it might at first appear. After all, Abraham—the father of the
three great monotheistic faiths—was himself a pagan when God first appeared to him,43 as were the Magi, the astrologers from the east who were
guided by the star to the location of Jesus.44 Indeed, several more examples
from the Bible alone can be given. Other clear examples of pagans who
Cf. e.g., Plato, Euthydemus, 272e.
Plato, Republic, 496c.
41
Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: With Continual Reference to Socrates, trans.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992),
157–167.
42
Paul W. Gooch has written a interesting book, Reflections on Jesus and Socrates: Word and
Silence (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1996). Gooch states, “I find in
Socrates not Christian faith but a stance toward the god that shares a recognizable architecture with the experience of Christian faith.” Ibid., 18.
43
See Genesis 12, Acts 7:2 and, most importantly, Joshua 24:2.
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received a special divine revelation include Abimelech, the king of Gerar45;
Balaam, the pagan prophet46; Job47; King Neco48; and Cornelius, the Roman
centurion.49 Other likely examples include Melchizedek,50 Pharaoh,51 King
Nebuchadnezzar,52 King Belshazzar,53 King Cyrus,54 and Eliphaz the
Temanite.55 Thus, it is not really so odd or unusual to hold that a pagan
was a recipient of special divine revelation. In fact, to all appearances, it
seems that a Christian should hold that God is quite willing to give special
revelations to pagans when it serves his good pleasure to do so.
IV. Apostle, Genius, or Something Else?
Readers familiar with Kierkegaard’s Book on Adler will have a special reason
for concern at the primary conclusion of the preceding section. After all, it
might be thought that the claim that Kierkegaard was committed to Socrates
being the beneficiary of special divine revelation implies that Socrates is to
be viewed as an “apostle” in the sense that Kierkegaard gives to this term—
a view that Kierkegaard no doubt would have rejected out of hand. But to
claim that Socrates was the beneficiary of special divine revelation is by no
means to imply that he was an apostle in Kierkegaard’s sense.
To see why, it is necessary to get clearer on Kierkegaard’s project in The
Book On Adler. This work is Kierkegaard’s response to the confused and
shifting claims of Adolph Adler, a pastor on the Danish island of Bornholm. Adler claimed to have received a revelation in which a new doctrine
was dictated to him by Jesus Christ—only later to declare that his “revelation” was actually a work of “genius.” Kierkegaard’s main goal in this
book is to rigorously distinguish the category of “apostle” from that of
“genius,” and thereby to bring crucial dialectical clarity about such matters into the public consciousness. But, as it happened, Kierkegaard never
published the book, largely out of concern for Adler and for the effect that
the book would have had on him.
In the book, Kierkegaard explains that “[t]he qualification ‘genius’ lies
within the sphere of immanence.”56 That is, the insights or productions
of the genius are a consequence of a purely human resourcefulness and
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creativity. Furthermore, “the genius,” Kierkegaard says, “is born.”57 In
other words, as a genius, one’s achievements are realizations of a potential
that has existed within oneself from birth. A genius comes into one’s own
as a natural consequence of one’s life-development. Moreover, a claim that
one is a genius is justified by appeal to rational or aesthetic considerations.
As such, even one who does not qualify as a genius can resemble the
genius to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon one’s native endowments or capacities.
The apostle, on the other hand, is “not born.”58 Rather, just as Kierke
gaard describes the genius as belonging to the “sphere of immanence,”
so the apostle is said to belong to the “sphere of transcendence.”59 This
means that the apostle’s doctrine proceeds from a source that is transcendent of human powers. Even if the apostle’s doctrine is comprehensible
or independently discoverable by human beings, the manner in which
the apostle comes to be in possession of the doctrine is qualitatively different than the way in which one who is a genius “hits upon” one’s ideas.
Furthermore, in Kierkegaard’s description, “the apostle is a man who is
called and appointed by God and sent by him on a mission. An apostle
does not develop in such a way that he gradually becomes what he is
[potentially]. Prior to becoming an apostle, there is no potential possibility; every human being is essentially equally close to becoming that.”60
Contrary to the genius, then, there can be no resemblance of greater or
lesser degree to the apostle, for an apostle is not what he is due to his native endowments. Rather, “every human being is essentially equally close
to becoming” an apostle by being the subject of an authoritative special
revelation.61
Given this description, the reader might feel confirmed in his or her
suspicion that I am making Socrates into an apostle. After all, as I have argued, the manner in which Socrates comes to awareness of the obligation
to love the neighbor is through the activity of the daimonion, a transcendent, divine phenomenon whose communication takes the form of special
revelation.62 Furthermore, anyone familiar with the Oracle at Delphi’s significance to Socrates’s philosophical activity will know that Socrates did
claim to have been appointed by the god and sent on a religious mission
to the people of Athens.63 So how, then, can one consistently maintain that
Socrates is not an apostle?
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The key comes in taking careful note of a particular quality that
Kierkegaard ascribes to the apostle. As he writes, “[A]n apostle is what
he is by having divine authority. The divine authority is what is qualitatively
decisive.”64 This authority, Kierkegaard maintains, is what separates the
apostle Paul, for example, from a Plato or a Shakespeare.65 To wit, whereas
the insights or productions of the genius are judged to be true or great by
appeal to rational or aesthetic criteria, the apostle’s doctrine is asserted
simply on the basis of its divine authority. Indeed, Kierkegaard imagines
the apostle to declare, “I make you eternally responsible for your relationship to this doctrine by my having proclaimed it as revealed to me and
therefore by having proclaimed it with divine authority.”66
It is very hard to envisage such a declaration coming from the mouth
of Socrates. As the quintessential philosopher, Socrates characteristically
seeks to justify his views by appeal to rational considerations. Indeed,
Socrates is never found appealing to the authority of his daimonion as if
to hold people responsible for a doctrine that it has revealed. Lacking this
“qualitatively decisive” characteristic, then, Socrates cannot be an apostle.
This does not, of course, mean that we must categorize Socrates as a
mere genius. After all, between the genius and the apostle there is not an
excluded middle. Just as Kierkegaard would distinguish Socrates from the
apostle Paul, so I maintain, he would distinguish Socrates from Plato. And
as a matter of fact, Kierkegaard does so quite explicitly. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript Kierkegaard describes Socrates as continually departing
from Plato. The thesis that all knowing is recollecting, Kierkegaard says,
certainly belongs to both of them, but Socrates continually parts with it because he wants to exist. By holding Socrates to the thesis that all knowing is
recollecting, one turns him into a speculative philosopher instead of what he
was, an existing thinker who understood existing as the essential. The thesis
that all knowing is recollecting belongs to speculative thought, and recollecting is immanence. . . . To emphasize existence . . . is the Socratic, whereas
the Platonic is to pursue recollection and immanence.67

Plato, then, is concerned with what can be accomplished merely by means
of the capacities that lie immanently within one’s own self. In contrast,
Socrates emphasizes “existence,” which, in Kierkegaard’s distinctive
sense, means an ethico-religious striving toward an ideal. Given that it was
“by means of the eternal and ‘something divine,’ [that Socrates] prevented
his love for people from coming to a standstill,”68 and his consequent
“holding himself close to the requirement”69 by means of the daimonion, it
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is plausible to view Socrates’s ethico-religious striving as dependent upon
this transcendent source—and hence, to view Socrates as excluded from
the category of mere genius.
Labeling Socrates as a mere genius becomes even less plausible once
one recognizes that Kierkegaard remarks upon the “analogous likeness”
of Socrates’s situation to the Christian paradox that goes beyond human
speculative powers.70 Indeed, the original concern that I was making
Socrates into an apostle is not totally without grounding, for Socrates certainly does resemble the apostle in very important ways, not least of which
is his being the beneficiary of special divine revelation. (Although, to be
sure, none of these resemblances is of that kind which Kierkegaard explicitly rules out, namely, resemblance in the possession of divine authority).
So just as we saw that Socrates is not an apostle, neither is he a genius.
Rather, lacking the qualitatively decisive properties of each category—
divine authority, on one hand, and a purely human resourcefulness, on
the other—it seems that we must understand Socrates as constituting a
category all his own.
V. Revelation Without Authority
Socrates was not an apostle, yet neither was he a mere genius. But how
can it be, one might ask, that Socrates was the beneficiary of special divine
revelation, yet failed to possess any authority on account of that revelation? To answer this question, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of
Socrates’s divine sign. Recall the charge that Socrates corrupted the youth
of Athens. Upon hearing this charge, Euthyphro points out the connection
between it and Socrates’s daimonion:
[EUTHYPHRO:] Tell me, what does [Meletus] say you do to corrupt the
young?
SOCRATES: Strange things, to hear him tell it, for he says that I am a maker
of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the
old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it.
EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you. So he has written this indictment against you
as one who makes innovations in religious matters.71

In attributing Socrates’s prosecution to his claim to have the daimonion,
Euthyphro has not merely jumped to the wrong conclusion, as he so often
does. Rather, Euthyphro’s explanation is later confirmed in Socrates’s
defense against Meletus and his other “later accusers.”72 There, Socrates
says, “I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his
deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it
speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never
Cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 206n.
Plato, Euthyphro, 3a–b
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encourages me to do anything.”73 Thus, the daimonion provides an explanation of why Socrates is being prosecuted.
But just a bit later in the dialogue, Socrates gives a different explanation
for his prosecution. He says, “Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why
I am a defendant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like
that [i.e., stories of murder, cannibalism, castration, quarrels, battles, etc.]
being said about the gods.”74 Here, Socrates’s explanation is that he is being
prosecuted because he cannot believe in stories of immoral gods (where
“immoral” is understood to denote actions relevantly similar to murder,
cannibalism, castration, quarrels, battles, etc.). What is the relationship
between this explanation and the first explanation? That is, what is the
relationship between Socrates’s belief in his daimonion and Socrates’s disbelief in stories of immoral gods? Is one explanatorily more fundamental?
It could be that Socrates’s belief in his daimonion and his disbelief
in stories of immoral gods are separate and unrelated examples of his
particular heterodoxy. But exploring the possibility of an explanatory
connection yields some intriguing insights. It is hard to see how Socrates’s
disbelief in stories of immoral gods could be explanatorily prior to his
belief in the daimonion. But it is not quite as difficult to see how his belief
in the daimonion could be explanatorily prior to his disbelief in stories of
immoral gods.
The case can be made that Socrates’s self-avowed life-long75 and
frequent76 acquaintance with the divine sign was itself the decisive determinant of what were, for his context, his radically progressive moral
and religious views. One thing such a case must explain is how Socrates
gets from the daimonion’s appearances—which are always merely dissuading—to his positive moral and religious notions. Given what has
been established above, Socrates receives a revelation when the daimonion
makes its sign, but the content of each revelation amounts to nothing more
than a minutely specific prohibition: Socrates knows, at that specific time
and place, that the specific action he is about to perform is the wrong thing
to do. As one commentator notes, “This leaves a good deal for Socrates
to reason about: What about this act-token is wrong, or is it the act-type?
What about the current situation makes it wrong? In what does wrongness itself consist? and so on.”77 Furthermore,
[t]he daimonion offers Socrates no rules of conduct, no general principles, no
moral definitions; its activity seems always to be unexpected and it offers
73
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Socrates no explanations of its activity. However slight the information he
has received, it is enough to prevent Socrates from taking so much as another step in the undertaking he was considering. Socrates may not know
the first thing about why he has been stopped, but he seems completely and
unshakably certain that he must not do what he was about to do.78

So how does Socrates get from the opposition of the daimonion to his radical moral and religious notions, including his awareness of the obligation
to love the neighbor? The following considerations provide the essential
ingredients of a plausible explanation of the process.
First, Socrates’s source of confidence in the rightness of his actions
lends support to this understanding of the daimonion’s role. As Socrates
explains in the Apology,
At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifestation, frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do
something wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced
with what one might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of
evils, my divine sign has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn,
or when I came into court, or at any time that I was about to say something
during my speech. . . . What do I think is the reason for this? I will tell you.
What has happened to me may well be a good thing, and those of us who
believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of
this, for it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not
about to do what was right [agathon].79

As this passage shows, although the daimonion’s appearances are always
specific and prohibitive, Socrates can still find the daimonion’s non-appearances to be quite instructive, given its extensive history of opposing him
when he was about to do something wrong. Here Socrates says that it is
impossible that the daimonion did not oppose him if his actions were not
going to result in something agathon—the adjective form of arête (virtue,
excellence) and the strongest term of approbation in the Greek language.80
Socrates’s inference is that, because his daimonion did not appear, he can
be assured that his actions will produce a virtuous or excellent result.
Thus, what Socrates takes away from this experience is not just the
negative conviction that it is a mistake to believe that death is an evil.
Rather, immediately after this passage, this experience gives rise in
Socrates’s mind to the “good hope”—or perhaps we should say, the
“inkling” or “intimation”—“that death is a blessing.”81 This was quite a
radical sentiment in Socrates’s ancient Athenian context, but Socrates was
utterly unashamed to declare it, even if it meant incurring the ridicule of
his listeners. Indeed, Socrates was gripped by something stronger than
Brickhouse and Smith, “Socrates’ Gods and the Daimonion,” 86.
Plato, Apology, 40a–c.
80
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the mores of his culture, which fostered the belief that death was an evil
and that the most important thing for a dead man was a good reputation among the living.82 As Arthur Adkins observed in his study of Greek
values,
Until Socrates, no one takes a firm stand and says, “let them mock.” It cannot be done: if others’ opinion is overtly the standard, and if one’s beliefs
about the nature of life support that standard, it is both logically and psychologically impossible to set one’s own views against it. Socrates had his
daimonion; and needed it.83

Thus, because at any time Socrates is able to draw, not just on the daimonion’s immediate appearance or non-appearance, but on the totality
of his past experiences of it, his reflection on the daimonion’s activity is
capable of giving rise to affirmative, general, and countercultural views
about what actions conduce to virtue and wellbeing.
On Kierkegaard’s view, the daimonion would have opposed Socrates’s
actions that were contrary to love for the neighbor, and the daimonion
would have forbore to appear whenever Socrates took some action that
was consistent with love for the neighbor. Through its appearances and
non-appearances, Socrates would have acquired an extensive mental collection of particular loving behaviors that the daimonion did not oppose.
By examining those particular actions in order to discern their shared
nature—Socrates’s routine philosophical procedure84—he would have
acquired an awareness that actions of a generally altruistic nature were
conducive to virtue and wellbeing, and hence, morally choiceworthy.
While not rising to the level of full-blown knowledge, this awareness would
have constituted at least an “intimation” or “inkling” of the obligation to
love the neighbor. Furthermore, assuming that Socrates’s experience of
the daimonion colored his view of the gods generally, he naturally would
have found “it hard to accept [stories of murder, cannibalism, castration,
quarrels, battles, etc.] being said about the gods.”85
Of course, Socrates never could have been sure that he had put his
finger on the precise rule or principle behind the daimonion’s appearances
and non-appearances. Socrates was well aware of this fact, having followed up his statement that “there is good hope that death is a blessing”
with statements of uncertainty regarding whether that meant that death
is a pleasant dreamless sleep or a pleasant relocation to another place.86
While Socrates could have gleaned some things from the daimonion by
recognizing correlations between its occurrences and his intended actions,
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he would have faced an interesting version of the problem of induction:87
even if the daimonion had, without exception, allowed Socrates to perform
some particular type of action up to some point in his life, he could not
have been sure whether all actions of that type were permitted, or whether
that type of action was permitted, say, merely for individuals under a
certain age. Indeed, at any time there would be an endless number of principles consistent with the observed class of the daimonion’s appearances
and non-appearances: perhaps some actions are only allowed to parents,
or grandparents, or only in certain specific circumstances, or only immediately following some other particular action, or only on certain days,
or only with certain other people, or only while the moon was waxing or
waning—there are infinite possibilities.
Socrates never could be confident that any inductive generalization
from the daimonion’s occurrences would have had the backing of divine
authority, for he is allowed to know neither the rhyme nor the reason
behind its appearances. Although it is doubtful whether Socrates would
have understood this problem as a “problem of induction,” nevertheless it
seems plausible that he would have recognized it as a problem and felt its
intuitive force. Therefore, although it is plausible to think of the daimonion
as providing Socrates with a great deal of critical moral input, nothing that
Socrates inductively discerned from the daimonion’s appearances could
have qualified as knowledge, let alone as an authoritative revelation. In
conclusion, Socrates can have a divine revelation and still not possess divine authority because no doctrine is ever revealed to him. Socrates never
claims to have authority because he has no revealed doctrine that could be
authoritative.
VI. Why Might God Have Given Socrates the Daimonion?
In this section I shall hazard a couple of broad speculations as to what Kierkegaard might have believed regarding why God chose to give Socrates
the daimonion. As I argued above, the Christian tradition indicates that
God is quite willing to give special divine revelations to pagans when it
serves his good pleasure to do so. Consider this: Socrates lived in a religious context where many deities were recognized and venerated. If God
wished to make something of himself known to individuals living in such
a polytheistic religious context, how might he go about doing so? In order
to reveal himself truly, he would need to somehow ensure that his revelation was not co-opted into the polytheistic categories of the time. After all,
in such a context, a straightforward, propositional revelation would run
the risk of being perceived as simply “one more” utterance from the gods,
as merely “one more” of the same kind of divine phenomenon with which
the Athenians were so familiar.
87
This might be better described as a version of the problem of underdetermination. See
Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip Wiener (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1991).

WAS SOCRATES A CHRISTIAN BEFORE CHRIST?

141

The danger of this kind of mistaken co-option is well-attested by
chapter 14 of the New Testament book of Acts, which records an incident
wherein the apostles Paul and Barnabas were mistaken for the gods Zeus
and Hermes, and in sensational fashion. After the apostles’ preaching and
miraculous healing of a lame man in the city of Lystra, the people excitedly proclaimed to one another that “the gods have come down to us in
the form of men!”88 and the priest of Zeus even brought oxen and garlands to the city gates in order to make a sacrifice.89 Such behavior on the
part of the people is rendered intelligible by the fact that local mythology
told of a prior visit to a city in the ancient kingdom of Phrygia by Zeus
and Hermes. According to the legend, the gods were not well-received
and, as a consequence, they chose to destroy the city with a flood.90 The
people of Lystra were no doubt greatly motivated to avoid repeating the
Phrygians’ mistake—hence their piously energetic reception of Paul and
Barnabas.
It is in part to avoid the danger of being misunderstood in this way
that, when Paul later proclaims the resurrection of Christ to the Athenians
in the Areopagus, he goes to such great lengths to stress that the God of
which he speaks is the uniquely uncreated Creator of all things—and even
then, the book of Acts relates that many Athenians came away believing
that Paul had proclaimed to them two new deities: “Christ” and “Anastasis”—that is, “Resurrection”—a woman’s name in Greek.91 Accounts
such as this demonstrate why, in a polytheistic religious context, God’s
use of a daimonion-like manifestation to communicate truth about Himself,
His character, or His will might make very good sense, indeed.
Furthermore, Socrates was more or less the initiator of the grand
Hellenistic philosophical tradition that shaped the intellectual climate
within which the doctrines of the early Christian church were formed.
If a professing Christian is not to reject such central Christian dogmas as
the Trinity and the Incarnation, it seems that one must accept the validity
of the conceptual categories in which such doctrines were expressed,
categories that were themselves forged in the fires of Greek philosophy.
Since Christians will readily accept that God was providentially at work
preparing the Jews for the proclamation of the Gospel,92 it is not much
of a stretch to hold that God was, in Socrates’s daimonion, working in the
Gentile world to lay the philosophical groundwork for the subsequent
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articulation of Christian doctrine.93 These possibilities are consistent with
Kierkegaard’s other views and can be thought of as a natural development
or logical extension of the comments that he makes on Socrates.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, it would be misleading—although perhaps not inaccurate—
to say that Kierkegaard saw Socrates as a Christian before Christ. After all,
Kierkegaard held that Socrates was not a Christian during his lifetime,
even while being convinced that he did in fact become one subsequent to
his death—and perhaps prior to Christ! Furthermore, Kierkegaard held
that Socrates was, during his lifetime, a very special figure with a quite
unusual relationship to God. Specifically, Kierkegaard held that by means
of his daimonion Socrates received nonuniversally-normative special divine revelations—revelations that, though falling short of imparting any
authoritative doctrine, nevertheless plausibly provided Socrates with crucially determinative, morally formative guidance that ultimately brought
him to some awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor. Moreover,
Kierkegaard held that one can come to possess an awareness of this obligation only through divine revelation, and, interestingly enough, this
claim—what above I have called the divine origination thesis—can itself
be understood as a kind of uniqueness claim. The most appropriate way
of understanding this statement is to construe it, not as identifying Christianity as unique, but as the claim that, regardless of how many times an
awareness of the obligation to love may have appeared in human history,
any such awareness proceeds from a unique source. To be sure, the claim is
not that the content of Christianity has no parallels in any other religion or
wisdom tradition, but rather that the obligation to love is something that
must be divinely impressed anytime it appears.94
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